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AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION*
By NOEL LYON**

The Article sets out a theory of interpretation where the Charter reflects an
authoritative standard of public policy. It is not to be used only as a test of legality
but as a test of legitimacy. Section 35 of the Constitution on aboriginal rights
offers an opportunity in which the Charter's central concept of fundamental justice
in the context of a free and democratic society can be applied to break out of
sterile common law conceptions and interpretations. The questions of legitimacy
and public policy are instrumental to the way we govern ourselves.
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L INTRODUCTION
We tend to neglect the obvious, and because fundamentals
seem obvious to us, we quickly move past them to more challenging,
technical tasks ... to specifics. What could be more obvious, for
instance, than the nature of a free and democratic society to people
who have lived in one all their lives? And did we not invent
fundamental justice?
Because fundamentals of constitutional law are taken for
granted, we tend to assume that they are fully incorporated into our
technical analysis and given the primacy that is their due. If they
are as pervasive to our constitutional doctrine as we believe, there
is no need to check the results of factual inquiries and legal
reasoning against them.
Our retreat into the technical and the specific is too hasty.
This is especially evident in the case of a document such as the
Constitution Act, 19821 which has profound implications for our
future because of the way it has changed some of the fundamental
ideas on which our constitutional thinking is based. Business as
usual is not an adequate response to a document that entrenches a
charter of rights and freedoms, affirms aboriginal rights, and
introduces a supremacy clause which subordinates even legislatures
to the Constitution.
The Constitution Act, 1982 is a whole document whose
integrity is important for putting into perspective important2
questions of interpretation. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and Part 113 (aboriginal rights) express a vision of society as we
would like it to be. We deny ourselves the full, guiding value of
1 Constitution Act 1982, being schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

2 Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, Q 11 [hereinafter Charter].
3 Rights ofthe AboriginalPeoples of Canada,Part II of the ConstitutionAct 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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that vision by moving too quickly to the technical and the specific
as though the document were just another legal enactment.
The approach to interpretation offered here is neither
technical nor rigorous. It is an attempt to draw on the best in our
legal tradition, on things that we ignore or forget aswe become ever
more deeply immersed in the technical business of matching words
and phrases to precedents and other guides to legal usage. We are
already well down the road to a new specialty called Charter Law.
In this paper, I will attempt to give persuasive reasons why we
should develop a different approach and to indicate what that
approach should be.
1. THE THEORY
A certain amount of annotation is required to support the
assertion that the Charter and the rest of the ConstitutionAct,1982
do not speak for themselves. However, a vast quantity, as is
customary, is not needed. What the Charter does need is some
breathing space, a chance to develop a life of its own in a natural,
gradual way.
The Charteris an historic document destined to become one
of the great original sources of our legal system. It is also the start
of a new stage in our development as a free, responsible society that
is committed to the ideal of justice. The document is therefore
entitled to be heard in its own words before it becomes encrusted
with the explanatory words of commentators.
The first question that agitates us is whether the Charter
applies to private conduct; can it be enforced directly against citizens
as well as governments? Section 32 says that the Charter applies to
the Parliament of Canada, all of the provincial legislatures, and all
of the governments that go with those legislative bodies. However,
that is not clear enough for us. Non-inclusion need not import
exclusion, we say cleverly. What use is there, we argue, in securing
fundamental rights and freedoms against interference from
governments if the same protection is not available against private
conduct? Then we add, in ten'orem, that in this age of huge
corporations, computers, and mass communication, private
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concentrations of power may be larger and more dangerous than
governments.
This is a false argument. It asks us to assume that if the
Chater's protection does not run against private conduct, our
fundamental rights and frebdoms are left exposed to private
interference. While it is true that the common law was nurtured
more on property than freedom, it did nevertheless develop a system
of civil obligations as well as criminal prohibitions for the protection
of individual rights and freedoms. Also, where the common law
failed to move quickly enough, the protection of law has been
extended by legislation. Human rights legislation, which provides
legal sanctions against private discrimination, is perhaps the best
example.
So it seems likely that the Charter means what it says. Its
guaranteed rights and freedoms are enforceable in the courts only
against governments. The question we should be asking is whether
the Charter is a proper source of standards (evidence of public
policy) in cases between private parties. However, as long as we see
the Charter as simply an enumeration of legal rights, this question
need not be asked. Before we can regard the Charter as a general
source of law, we must come to think of it as an authoritative
statement of fundamental community values.
Everything about the Charter - its form, language, history,
and political context - speaks of an important original source of law.
As part of the Constitution of Canada, it is supreme law. Ordinary
laws must yield to it when they conflict. The common law, with its
preference for crisp rules, has always regarded public policy as an
unruly horse. The Charter, however, is a special case. It is an
historic document in which we have declared ourselves on matters
of fundamental importance. It is the responsibility of judges to
ensure that common law doctrine and statute interpretation are
developed and applied in ways that do not undermine the supreme
law of the Constitution. To the extent that the Charter speaks
intelligibly about matters within the purview of the common law or
statute interpretation, it trumps precedent, however old and
venerable.
This is the Charters proper "application" to private conduct.
The question is not whether the Charteris "in" or "out," but whether
it provides an authoritative standard or evidence of public policy
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relevant to the matter in dispute. If it does, common law doctrine
and the rules of statutory construction are seldom so clear and fixed
as to preclude an interpretation that is in harmony with the Charter.
If a conflict does arise, the ordinary rules of precedent require that
the highest authority be followed. This is no longer Parliament or
the Supreme Court of Canada. It is the Constitution.
Where conflict between supreme law and ordinary law is
serious, the Charter may provide a sufficiently clear statement of
public policy to serve as authority for revising doctrine. What was
formerly rendered unto Parliament must now be rendered unto the
Constitution. Common law and Equity fixed a system of values in
the legal system, and judges have done their best to adjust the
system to changing community standards and circumstances. As
incremental change became increasingly inadequate, legislation
became the dominant method of adjusting the system as well as the
most important source of law. Before 1982, it was supreme law for
most purposes. Now a new, comprehensive source that displaces
legislation as supreme law has been introduced. Our fixation with
questions such as whether the Charter "applies to" private conduct
may prevent us from grasping that there exists before us one of
those rare historic documents whose mission is to refashion our laws
and institutions and, through them, our society.
The Chartercannot just be slipped into a new compartment
in the legal mind marked "Charter Law." It must become an
integral part of the legal consciousness if it is to take its proper
place in our constitutional evolution. There is a cathedral under
construction in Barcelona which is expected to take at least one
hundred and fifty years to complete. No living person will witness
its completion. There is an analogy there with the ConstitutionAc
1982. Similarly it is not given to us or to any other generation to
fulfil the promise of the Charter. The "instant annotations" that
began to appear even before the Charter came into force are a bit
like the booms and derricks of the modern pre-fab construction
industry. We mean to take possession of the Charter and complete
construction of the new Constitution as quickly as possible, as
though it were an exposition site or a hydroelectric project.
Aboriginal peoples apparently do not feel the need for this
kind of social engineering. They seem to believe that if they live
according to the standards of conduct their culture prescribes, their
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communities will be strong and resilient. Social evolution will find
its own way, naturally developing under wise leadership, not as a
continuing battle to win acceptance of community standards and to
overcome the damage resulting from failure to observe them.
Perhaps these durable cultures with their patient, tolerant people
can provide clues as to how we can come to understand a legal
document of our own time as an historic document, not just a bowl
of legal fortune cookies.
The perspicacity of aboriginal peoples' perception of the
significance of the events of 1982 is evident in their attempt to
block patriation of the Constitution until their historic claims were
settled. Their "constitutional express train' rolled into Ottawa with
protesters, and their lawyers went to the Chancery Division of the
English Supreme Court to seek a declaration of outstanding British
obligations to aboriginal peoples to be met before the final transfer
of all legal powers to Canadian authorities. But to no avail. The
same morality that denied their humanity and their cultures' validity
in the seventeenth century prevailed to deny the legitimacy of their
claim to be part of the events of 1982. Once again they were
excluded from decisions affecting them in fundamental ways.
Fortunately, the aboriginal peoples were able to secure a
commitment to a just resolution of their claims in the form of
recognition and affirmation of their aboriginal and treaty rights.
That is section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, and it gives us a
way of viewing the Charterthat can help to subordinate some of the
cleverness and opportunism of legal analysis to the kind of wisdom
and integrity that has allowed aboriginal cultures to survive.
The actual words of section 35 are "the existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed." The language used is not very specific
and is the type that provides a field day for lawyers. However, the
context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a
codification of the case law on aboriginal rights that had
accumulated by 1982. Section 35 calls for a just settlement for
aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules of the game under
which the Crown established courts of law and denied those courts
the authority to question sovereign claims made by the Crown.
Those courts were bound to legitimize every sovereign act of
suppression of aboriginal cultures. That kind of arrangement has
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nothing to do with justice as conceived by the ConstitutionAc4 1982
and by international standards to which Canada is committed. The
old rules embodied in precedent are therefore not helpful when it
comes to translating the words of section 35 into reality.
Section 35 is a solemn commitment to honour the just land
claims of aboriginal peoples, fulfil treaty obligations, and respect
those rights of aboriginal peoples which the Charter, aided by
international law, recognizes as their fundamental rights and
freedoms. What else could it be? Constitutional reform is not done
to continue the status quo.
Section 35 is an extraordinary law and we will learn much as
it is implemented, just as the Americans have learned much from
the equal protection clause in the 14th amendment to their
constitution. The experience will help to restore the integrity of a
document which has already been fragmented into neat boxes of
courtroom ammunition. We hardly know how to begin such an
exercise that will take us back to the great tradition that nurtured
Equity, a time when, in the words of William Least Heat Moon,
"time and men and deeds connected. 4
To European eyes, the common law has been generous to
aboriginal peoples. It has recognized their traditional way of life by
formulating a right to hunt, fish, and gather on unoccupied Crown
land which was once their undisputed territory. In the United
States, it even accorded them a measure of sovereignty. More
recently, in the Calder5 case, the Supreme Court divided evenly on
the question of whether the Nishgas hold land rights to the Nass
Valley of British Columbia. If the question goes before the Court
again, the Judges could, by adopting the interpretation of Mr.
Justice Hall, recognize and enforce these aboriginal land rights.
However, it has been the Dene Nation of the Northwest Territories
who have cleared the way to a full understanding of what was at
stake in the intense battle to have aboriginal rights entrenched in
the Constitution. The Dene have refused to bring their land claims

4 william Least Heat Moon, Blue Highways: A Journey Into America, (Boston, Toronto:
Little, Brown and Company, 1982), at 5.
5 Calder v. A.-G. British Columbia (1973), [1973] S.C.R. 313, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1.
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before the courts on the ground that those courts were established
by an intruding foreign government with no legitimate authority over
the Dene territory. The Dene understand that courts established by
the Crown will ultimately accept without question an express
assertion of title to land that is made by the Crown. The whole
purpose of courts is to preserve the order established by the
sovereign power of the state.6
Those were the ground rules followed by the courts up to
1982. The question now is whether the Supreme Court of Canada,
if called upon to interpret section 35, would feel bound to follow
the precedents on aboriginal rights or would see in that provision a
recognition of aboriginal rights defined in accordance with the
Constitution's standard of free, self-governing peoples, and modern
standards of international law concerning subject peoples.
If the Dene are right, then the first fundamental right of
aboriginal peoples is the right of self-determination. That means
looking to aboriginal cultures to define the full range of fundamental
rights and freedoms. To apply the Charter directly to aboriginal
peoples would in itself be a violation of the right of selfdetermination, for the Charteris neither of their making nor to their
liking. However noble its language and intent, the Charter is a
product of European culture. It is no more their fundamental law
than the IndianAct7 is their tribal law. This conclusion is abhorrent
to legalists, who, like nature, abhor a vacuum. But a modest
measure of cultural humility will allow us to understand that there
is no vacuum. Section 35 is for aboriginal peoples what the Charter
is for the new Canadians. There is a vacuum only if we lack the
will and the imagination to complete the work that was begun when
section 35 was hastily drawn up and inserted in the Joint Resolution
of 1981. The irony of that concession to aboriginal peoples is that
it was made so that their interests would not hold up the acting out
of the final chapter in transplanting European culture to their land.

6 Mel Watkins, Dene Nation, The Colony Within (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1977).
7

Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
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We can note then, as an aside, one reason why aboriginal
culture is worth saving: it can teach us something of the virtues of
patience and tolerance.
We have arrived at a new way of seeing the Charter. We
must probe beyond its language to find its soul in order to
understand how to draw from aboriginal cultures the equivalent
traditions and ideas that are of fundamental importance. To do this
we will need the help of aboriginal peoples, for only they can speak
with authority for their collective vision of the world. The idea of
non-native judges proceeding to "interpret' section 35 armed with
books of precedent and anthropology, is once again repugnant to
the fundamental right of self-determination. The courts are not
equipped to do the job, and it would be unfair to them and grossly
unfair to the aboriginal peoples to lay the task at their door.
However, we are slow to learn. Section 35 is supreme law, and if
we fail to honour its commitment voluntarily, the Supreme Court
will be forced to elaborate the aboriginal rights that have been
affirmed. The cynic might observe that a strong motivation for
failure in the political arena is the knowledge that the judges seem
most unlikely to escape the legalism that has shaped their minds and
find a legitimate approach that will allow them to give judicial effect
to what we all know to be the compact of section 35.
The likelihood that the courts will in the end be called on to
interpret section 35 is one reason for exploring alternatives to the
usual methods of interpreting legal language, but there is an even
better reason. In exploring alternatives, we may succeed in shifting
the emphasis of constitutional interpretation away from words, and
towards the values the document has tried to capture through those
words.
The section-by-section approach to the Charterfails us here.
What we need is a whole view of the document; its vision of society.
I believe that the essence of the Charteris captured by Section 7:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.

Fundamental justice is the Charter's central ideal. What
follows section 7 is just an elaboration of that ideal. Cruel and
unusual treatment, for example, is inherently repugnant to
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fundamental justice, as is discrimination. Equality and language
rights are the Charters particular formulations meant to counter the
fundamental injustice of discrimination 8 Life, liberty, and security
of the person are the ideals of a free and democratic society, and
what comes before section 7 is elaboration of the essential features
of such a society. Section 1, which states an obvious truth about
how rights and freedoms take their colour from their context, is
excepted. Section 1 ought not to become the basis of a distinct
"step" in the Charter's interpretation, but should be seen as a
pervasive guide to the interpretation of all rights and freedoms. It
could have been omitted, leaving judges to infer it from the context
in which they live, breathe, and work.
Equally, the Chartercould have consisted of section 7 alone,
leaving judges to work out the particulars of fundamental justice and
of the right to life, liberty, and security of the person. But our legal
tradition is otherwise. The more particulars we provide, the more
confident and comfortable are those who interpret the law.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to pause and contemplate a Charter
containing only section 7, for it produces a different conception of
the document. More importantly, though, it gives us a starting point
for the elaboration of aboriginal rights into an equivalent set of
fundamental rights and freedoms.
To a native North American, the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person means a different set of arrangements than to
someone of European origin. The collective vision and cooperative
ethic that have been adopted by these old cultures do not fit the
acquisitive, competitive outlook that brought Europeans to this
continent in the first place. The North American instinct is to live
in harmony with the natural world, not to conquer it. We can
therefore state one more reason why aboriginal cultures are worth
preserving: they offer very long experience in successful social
organization and resource conservation.
The Chartersparticularizations of section 7 are largely alien
to the North American experience. It is for this reason that we
need to identify the Charter's values as a first step in elaborating

8 Charter,supra, note 2 at ss. 12, 15, 16.
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section 35 into an equivalent set of rights and freedoms for
aboriginal peoples.
When the Chartersets out in sections 2 to 6 its fundamental
freedoms, democratic rights, and mobility rights, it is pinning down
the right of self-determination for Canadians. We are a free people,
The
governing ourselves through representative institutions.
formulations reflect the European experience, which was a long
"struggle against tyrants, large and small, against the view that
personhood and rights are the privilege of a few, not the birthright
of all. The North American experience was different, at least until
the Europeans arrived. No doubt there have been tyrants and acts
of oppression in aboriginal cultures, but it is nonetheless true that
their way of life is inherently democratic. Leadership is a burden
rather than a prize. The extent of the differences and why they
exist are questions best left to those peoples to answer for
themselves. In so doing, they will identify the equivalent conditions
that require constitutional protection if the collective and individual
rights of self-determination are to be guaranteed to them as they
are to other Canadians.
We can usefully speculate a bit about where this inquiry will
lead. Anyone who has ever observed a band council meeting will
know that in aboriginal communities, the right of free speech is not
threatened in the same way as it has been in the feuding remnants
of the Holy Roman Empire. It is assumed that all have a right to
be heard, and the social habits that secure this right are probably
more effective than legal sanctions that may secure rights only on
paper. Accepted standards of conduct are a stronger bond of
community than court orders. The cultural differences are subtle
but powerful. It is not that the differences are clear and pervasive,
but dominant trends are observable.
Take freedom of religion as another point of contrast
between cultures. Among aboriginal peoples, religion is not a
doctrine or particular activity, but a way of life. The beliefs that
inform their vision of the world and their place in it are pervasive
elements of their culture. The idea of religion as a severable kind
of after-hours activity is foreign to that culture. The separation of
church and state would be an absurdity. This insight could help the
rest of us understand our own problems with religion. It might lead
to further insights into the causes of social disintegration and
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environmental degradation. Understanding of causes is the first step
towards remedies.
The democratic right to vote, run for public office, and have
regular sessions of representative legislatures look strange to native
North Americans. Europeans must have serious character defects if
they feel the need to entrench in their constitution a requirement
that the community's chosen leaders meet in public from time to
time to deal with matters of common interest. It can fairly be
pointed out that the dominant culture in Canada is far more
complex than any aboriginal culture, but complexity alone cannot
explain the Charter. The record discloses a persistent reluctance to
accept the restraints of a free and democratic society along with the
freedoms. For all our patronizing of these primitive cultures, they
may yet teach us something about community.
Aboriginal peoples have their own ways of securing
fundamental freedoms and democratic rights that come from long
experience of self-government. We may not understand or agree
with all those ways, but if the consent of others is the condition of
legitimacy, then the fundamental right of self-determination is gone
and section 35 becomes a new entrenched Indian Act.
The likely result of working out the right of selfdetermination will be a situation in which each aboriginal community
will reach a set of arrangements that works best for it. The linking
of those arrangements to the larger political system from which
extrication is no longer feasible can be done by an Act of
Parliament, agreement, or constitutional amendment. That is a
matter of form. What will matter is that the arrangements to secure
life, liberty, and security of the person will have been worked out by
the aboriginal peoples themselves in the exercise of their right of
self-determination.
Does this mean that aboriginal peoples will be denied the
fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by other Canadians under
the Charter? Quite the contrary. Only by listening to native
leaders and respecting their translation of the Charter'svalues into
fundamental aboriginal rights can we secure life, liberty, and security
of the person for aboriginal peoples.
That inquiry will lead us to an aboriginal view of a free and
democratic society. We turn next to an aboriginal conception of
fundamental justice. No doubt there is much that is universal in the
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Chartees particulars of fundamental justice, but for present purposes
they are suspect. They look too much like a catalogue of human
rights violations drawn from the European experience. Aboriginal
cultures may have a broader vision of fundamental justice, one that
can take us beyond the silly idea that the most important question
is whether fundamental justice is a procedural standard only, or
bears substantive content. An old Cree, Haida, or Mohawk is likely
to tell us what should be obvious; the most important question is
how one distinguishes what is fundamental from what is not. The
Constitution guarantees those aspects of justice that are fundamental,
probably in the belief that ordinary justice will thereby be reasonably
assured. The Constitution can only do so much, and the word
"fundamental" is used to characterize its limited role.
So the aboriginal peoples are entitled to arrive at their own
particulars of fundamental justice, or to have none at all if they are
satisfied that those entrusted with power and those who choose
them will know when the limits are being pressed. Fundamental
justice may have a common meaning among aboriginal peoples such
that particulars are not required. The same may be true for the
dominant culture, but when legal sanctions displace social sanctions,
the need for particulars and precedents increases.
The right of self-determination carries with it the right of the
group to hold its own vision of fundamental justice. The vision held
by aboriginal peoples may seem to us less humane than ours, or
possibly more humane, but it is theirs. In fact, it is unlikely to differ
all that much in the ideal. It is also unlikely to be encumbered with
the kind of legalism that would divert its force into debates about
procedure and substance.
There is some opinion abroad that all this is the road to
apartheid, the antithesis of freedom and human rights. That is a
serious charge and I want to contest it. I argue that if apartheid sits
at one end of the spectrum of human dignity, then the proposed
elaboration of section 35 lies at the opposite end. In moving from
one end to the other, one would pass through forced assimilation,
under which a minority culture is accorded the same rights and
freedoms as the majority, irrespective of whether those rights and
freedoms respond to the values of the minority culture. Apartheid
is forced exclusion, a denial of personhood, and with it the basic
rights of freedoms that are taken for granted by those who are
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included. Self-determination is the opposite of apartheid and is
higher on the scale of human dignity than forced assimilation.
Moreover, where the option of voluntary assimilation is always open,
as is the case for Canada's aboriginal peoples, there is no basis for
comparison to apartheid.
It is important that the apartheid issue be disposed of
because there is still a residue of imperial sentiment in the land,
urging that the best thing 'We"can do for "them" is to force
assimilation. We find it hard to accept the fact that subject peoples
and the right of self-determination are real problems in Canada.
There are two ways of responding to the idea that section 35
should become the basis for a distinctive aboriginal charter of rights
and freedoms. One is that it will complicate things horribly, lead to
conflicting constitutional standards, and make it impossible to
develop a coherent interpretation of the Constitution. The other is
that it will enrich our society by providing us with a view of
ourselves "through the looking glass" by way of comparison with
cultures that have evolved through thousands of years' experience in
the land we now share. I choose the latter response without
hesitation because our experience with federalism and cultural
duality suggests that diversity makes for vitality.
If we honour the commitment of section 35 and respect the
aboriginal peoples' right of self-determination, the future will take
care of itself. Coercion has been tried for two centuries and has
been a costly failure. In a world where aboriginal cultures continue
to fare badly, this could be our greatest national achievement to
come out of the events of 1982.
The search for an understanding of section 35 has yielded a
conception of the Charterthat is worth pursuing. Section 7 becomes
the essence of the document, and the surrounding provisions
become an elaboration of the essence. Section 1 is seen as a
declaratory statement, setting a general tone for interpretation, and
the whole Charter becomes a guide to an understanding of
aboriginal rights. This conception may lead us to see constitutional
matters differently and to ask questions we did not ask before.
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III. SECIION 7
Commentators have mainly treated section 7 as just one of
the many Charterprovisions to be interpreted according to its terms.
Seeing it as a pivotal provision containing the central ideas that are
elaborated in the other provisions gives us another way of looking
at both section 7 and the Charter as a whole. The Supreme Court
had difficulty with the language of section 7 in its early encounter
with it in the cruise missile case? The language of life, liberty, and
security of the person is so general as to be universal. If meant as
a definition of an enforceable legal right, it renders virtually every
legislative enactment and executive act subject to judicial review for
compliance with its standard. It is hard to imagine any act of
government that does not in some way infringe on someone's life,
liberty, or security of the person. The entire Criminal Codezo is a
set of restraints on everyone's liberty.
If section 7 is seen as a statement of the Charter's essence,
then the right to life, liberty, and security of the person can be
taken as merely declaratory of that essence, serving at the same time
as the platform on which the principles of fundamental justice are
mounted. "Fundamental justice" is broad but not universal and is an
appropriate standard to entrust to judicial power. Judges fashioned
the whole body of Equity with no more to guide them than the
standard of justice, or good conscience. Now the Constitution gives
us fundamental justice as a new general standard for public law. It
also provides a few examples to prime the judicial pump. The
judges have a limited, but important part to play in making the
whole body of public law accord with the new standard.
In this interpretation, the thrust of section 7 is directed
through the principles of fundamental justice. This would free
judges from the impossible task of containing the language of life,

9 The Queen v. OperationDismantle Ina(1983), [1983] 1 F.C. 745, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 193
(Fed. CA).
10

CrininalCode, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
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liberty, and security of the person in a credible way, allowing them
to give full expression to fundamental justice. The alternative is to
give a restrictive interpretation to fundamental justice, adopting the
view that it confers only procedural rights. The Supreme Court will
make the choice, but in doing so the judges ought to consider how
important are public perceptions of the Constitution. It is unlikely
that citizens will take the Constitution seriously if they are told by
their Supreme Court that fundamentally unjust laws are acceptable
as long as they are applied to all in a fair and even-handed manner.
Nor are thoughtful citizens likely to be persuaded that the provisions
that follow section 7 exhaust the substantive content of fundamental
justice.
Once again the rights formulations may be blocking our view
of the Constitution. As an individual right, the right to be treated
in accordance with fundamental justice has the potential to spawn a
whole galaxy of precedents. As a constitutional standard, it has the
potential to transform public law. The question for our theory of
constitutional interpretation is which is the primary function of the
Constitution and which incidental. The answer cannot come from
the common law. It has its own theory to serve its own distinctive
needs and purposes.
IV. SECTION 1
The idea that section 1 sets out a distinct test to be applied
after an infringement of a Charter right has been established is an
attractive one to analytical minds. It conforms to the orderly, stepby-step approach that allows complex matters to be broken down
into components for sequential treatment. However, this analytical
approach adds to the fragmentation of the section-by-section,
encyclopedic approach of commentators, and we should consider the
effect of this on the Charter'sintegrity as a whole vision of society.
Not only does the Charter have its own internal coherence
with section 7 as the nucleus, but it also has an historical and social
context that is important to anyone trying to understand the
document and its particular provisions.
The character of
fundamental rights and freedoms is inherently dependent on context.
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The idea that a prima facie assessment of infringement can be made
in the abstract, and the context of reality then applied separately to
the result if an infringement is found may be the first step in taming
the Charterso that it will fit the common law mode of reasoning.
The CanadianBill of Rights" was tamed by the "frozen concepts"
approach, 12 after which it quickly became a dead letter.
One of the Charter's principal objects may be the freeing of
judicial minds from common law thinking so that they might fashion
a modem human rights jurisprudence around the Charters vision of
society. One way to subvert that object is to treat section 1 like a
legislative enactment whose every word and phrase requires
definitive explication.
If the Charter'sintegrity as an historic document is essential
to its success, then section 1 should be seen as merely declaratory
of the proper approach to interpretation. Judges ought not to hang
on each key word and phrase but should note simply that the
section confirms the obvious fact that the content and limits of
rights and freedoms are matters of context. They can then forget
about section 1 and get on with the task of interpreting the Charter
in context. The knowledge they need is not the true meaning of
"reasonable" and "demonstrably justified," but rather the contours
and dynamics of a free and democratic society in addition to many
facts about the real world in which that society must pursue its
vision.

11 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App III.
12

The "frozen concepts" approach takes literally the statement in section 1 of the

CanadianBill of Rights that the rights and freedoms set out in that section "have existed" in
Canada, resulting in an interpretation of those rights and freedoms as codifying or "freezing"
Canadian human rights law as of 1960. This would mean, for example, that the Bills equality
rights would be subject to a tavern owner's right to refuse to serve a black man because he
is black, a right which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Christiev. York Corporation
(1940), [1940] S.C.R. 139, [1940] 1 D.LR. 81. The "frozen concepts" approach was prominent
in Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 651, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 485, where the
Court stated that freedom of religion in the CanadianBill of Rights means the Canadian idea
of freedom of religion that prevailed when the Bill was enacted. The other famous example
of this approach isA-G. Canadav. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349,38 D.L.R. (3d) 481, where the
Court decided that the Bill's right to equality before the law simply enacted Dicey's rule-oflaw principle that the law must be applied in the same way to all persons to whom it applies.
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Where dictionaries and digests prevail, the vision goes by
default. Without sustained attention to the whole document and its
purposes during the interpretive process, the Charter will be
dismantled into sterile chunks of verbiage and absorbed by the
general law. The experience of the CanadianBill of Rights will be
repeated.
The inquiries about context that are indicated by section 1
should be integral to the process of accommodating the Charter's
ideals to the complexities of the world as it is. The better the
interpreter's understanding of context, the better the chance of
interpretations moving the real world towards the ideal. Without
context, interpretation of an abstract document like the Charter
becomes guesswork. The risk of preconception and ideology
disguised as common sense becomes great. Therefore, context is
essential to interpretation from the outset and cannot be used as a
kind of screen for preliminary conclusions.
The theory, then, is that the Charteris an integral document
that calls for an integral approach to interpretation. That means an
approach that is philosophical rather than analytical. The process of
thinking through a suitable approach may help analytical minds make
the transition to it.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The concept of legality that shapes our thinking has itself
been shaped by the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. Legality,
as we know it, operates within the limits drawn by that doctrine. It
is an hierarchical concept whose lines of authority are linear and
whose mode of reasoning is analytical. It induces a response to the
ConstitutionAc4 1982 that is much the same as the response to an
Act of Parliament. The important questions are where the
document fits in the hierarchy and what sources are to be used to
give us the meaning of the document's language. Questions about
purposes and policies are incidental. They lie beyond the realm of
legality and are therefore asked only when the sources leave doubt
as to the intended meaning of words. The approach induced by the
concept of legality begins and ends with words and has, as its
objective, the discovery of the "true meaning" of those words.
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The concept of legality is not up to the task of developing
an interpretive framework for the Constitution Ac 1982. A
subordinate status for law is an inherent feature of that concept. It
cannot contemplate supreme law because such law cannot exist
under the governing doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. As long
as our Constitution was an Act of Parliament, it could be fitted into
the hierarchy and statute interpretation could be passed off as
constitutional interpretation. Condemned legislation was ultra vires
rather than unconstitutional.
The shift from legislative supremacy to supremacy of the
Constitution is so fundamental a change, that more is required than
adaptation of the approach to interpretation shaped by legality. The
difficulty began to emerge in the Constitutional Reference of 1981,13
where the Supreme Court had referred to it the question of whether
provincial consent was required for a constitutional amendment
achieved by joint resolution of the Houses of Parliament in Canada
followed by an Act of the British Parliament (the old amending
procedure). The question was one of fundamental principle for
which no answer was provided in any law enacted by a sovereign
legislature. It thus anticipated the kind of question the Court would
be facing under the new Constitution and called for a broader
approach to interpretation than the concept of legality offers.
The Court gave two answers, one in law, the other in
convention, and it reached the opposite conclusion in each. In law,
said the majority, there is no requirement for provincial consent, so
that no illegality would attach to the central government's
proceeding with the consent of only two provinces out of ten. By
implication, the central government could legally go ahead with no
provincial consent at all. According to convention, however, a
majority was of the opinion that a substantial measure of provincial
consent was required, so that it would be unconstitutional for the
central government to proceed with only two provinces consenting.
The Court used the word "unconstitutional" to characterize
action contrary to convention. This was an important recognition of
a difference between unconstitutional action and illegal action.

13
PatiadonReference orA.-G. Manitobav. A-G. Canada(1981), [1981] 1 S.CR. 753,
[1981] 6 W.W.R. 1, 125 D.LR. (3d) 1.
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Judicial minds are set in the mold of legality, and their response to
a real question of constitutionality that could not be avoided through
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy was to shift to the different
mode of thinking permitted by the concept of convention. Legality
produced a sterile approach because it generated a search for text
and specifics. Convention allowed a looser approach, a search for
evidence of a guiding principle that applied to the question. Even
there, though, the majority got it wrong by treating instances of
conforming conduct as the equivalent of precedents rather than as
evidence of a governing principle. The two judges who dissented
from the opinion on law got it right by going straight to the
principle, federalism, and treating it as so clearly a fundamental
principle of the Constitution, as to be judicially enforceable
irrespective of past conduct of governments.
There is a lesson here for interpretation of the Constitution
Act, 1982 with its broad standards and supremacy clause. It is
probably a fair inference that all nine judges understood that it was
contrary to fundamental principle for the central government to
proceed with constitutional amendment without provincial consent.
Their differences arose over whether they could intervene, and how.
The main problem seems to have been the entanglement of their
minds with the concept of legality that goes with a system of
parliamentary supremacy. Only two of the nine judges were able to
break free from the hold of that concept by perceiving that the
question referred to them transcended the boundaries of legality.
They saw the question as one of not just legality, but
constitutionality, for which there was a standard suitable for judicial
enforcement. Had they carried a majority with them, the case could
have become the start of a transition to a conscious theory of
constitutional interpretation under a supremacy clause. The case
may still provide some clues.
What led the judges to move from law to convention was
their sense that legality could not respond directly to such a broad
standard as federalism. Legality required some textual elaboration
of the standard, such as sections 91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 dividing legislative powers between the central and provincial
legislatures. The shift from law to convention allowed the judges to
see the question in terms of legitimacy, a concept that responds to
broad standards like federalism, the rule of law, and fundamental

ConstitutionalInterpretation
justice.
Legitimacy is probably the dominant concept of
international law, which works primarily with a small number of
basic principles, as does the Constitution. The lesson of the
Constitutional Reference of 1981 is that we should prefer legitimacy
over legality as the concept through which to develop an approach
to constitutional interpretation.
"Legal" means in accordance with the law or authorized by
law. It finds its standards in statute law or precedent. It assumes
legitimacy in the sovereign body that emits laws. The new
Constitution with its supremacy clause has removed the assumption
of legitimacy and has introduced standards for judicial review of all
government action. The resulting questions of constitutionality are
better understood as questions of legitimacy rather than as questions
of legality.
One's choice of concept in legal theory goes far to determine
approach and result. The famous Hart-Fuller debate 14 about the
status of Nazi laws was really a conflict between different concepts.
Professor Hart preferred the concept of legality provided by the
dominant theory of positive law. This led him to conclude that Nazi
laws, however repugnant, must be accorded the status of laws if they
have been enacted in accordance with the internal law-making rules
of the German state. Professor Fuller took issue. In his view, there
were universal standards to be met before a law could be valid at
all. Fuller approached the question through the concept of
legitimacy, a more open concept that operates beyond the domain
of legality. Legality assumes the legitimacy of the acts of legislatures
because they are sovereign bodies. Constitutionality considers
legitimacy to be open to question because a supremacy clause
attributes sovereignty to the people, whose constitution it is. The
Constitutionsets out standards of legitimacy for government, and the
Charter'sstandards could be described as the essential conditions on
which a free and democratic people agree to submit to the authority
of government. When governments fail to observe those standards,
they lose their legitimacy or act unconstitutionally. Questions of

14

The Hart-Fuller debate is found in two articles in the Harvard Law Review of 195758: H.LA. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" 71 Harv. LRev. 593, and
L Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart" 71 Harv. LhRev. 630.
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legality, as we have known them, do not arise until legitimacy has
been established or conceded.
The Chartersuse of rights formulations invites the approach
of legality. It is therefore important that judges settle in their own
minds the theory of the Constitution Ac4 1982 before committing
themselves to a model of interpretation. If they conclude that the
Charter is a list of rights and freedoms in form only, and in
substance a set of standards for government, they may conclude that
their status as supreme law can best be assured if they are seen as
standards of legitimacy.
An example of the effects of approaching interpretation in
terms of enforcing standards of legitimacy rather than adjudicating
legal rights is the elimination of the need for a "political questions"
doctrine. That doctrine excludes certain questions from judicial
review because they are not "legal" questions. The explanation given
is usually that the matters in question are committed by the
Constitution exclusively to non-judicial branches of government or
are not amenable to judicial methods of decision. The latter
explanation begs the question of whether judicial methods need
modifying to match constitutional responsibility.
The introduction of a supremacy clause, in principle, renders
all government action subject to judicial review. Perhaps the better
explanation for non-intervention in a particular case would be that
the Constitution provides no applicable standard of legitimacy. That
explanation is anchored squarely in the Constitution whereas the
conclusion of no justiciable issue may be derived from the "inherent"
character of judicial power, a source that may be unreliable at a
time of fundamental change in judicial responsibility.
The American apportionment cases provide a helpful
illustration of this problem. If the claims are thought to be based
on the right to the equal protection of the law, it seems obvious
that they cannot be sustained. Common experience tells us that
electoral districts cannot be drawn according to the rule of one man,
one vote. That rules out equality as an applicable standard unless
the court is prepared to engage in the risky business of working out
approximations of equality. The proper standard to apply may be
that of the representational principle, which is less dependent on
numbers than is equality. The question is then seen in terms of
whether the election laws produce disparities between districts so
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great as to violate the representational principle that is central to
democratic government. The Court, in finding this to be the case,
would be enforcing a standard of legitimacy, not just enforcing an
individual's right to vote. It was the presentation of apportionment
cases as cases involving equality rights that led to extensive
discussion of the "political questions" doctrine. That discussion,
which obscures rather than clarifies constitutional interpretation,
could have been avoided if the court had rejected the equality rights
rationale at the outset and had made it clear that the
representational principle, although not formulated as a particular
right, provided the applicable standard of legitimacy.
The cruise missile case in the Supreme Court of Canada
should have begun and ended with an insistence that the claimant
specify the standard of legitimacy it was asking the court to enforce.
If there was an applicable standard, it was that of fundamental
justice. For reasons stated earlier, the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person does not contain an enforceable standard of
legitimacy. It is declaratory of the essence of a free society to which
the standard of fundamental justice is applicable. The argument in
the case should have been about whether the decision to permit
testing of the cruise missile over Canada was such a potential threat
to the life, liberty, and personal security of Canadians that
fundamental justice required something more than cabinet
deliberations and a parliamentary committee hearing. In order to
succeed, the standard of fundamental justice would have to be
brought to bear on a question of real doubt as to the authority of
the federal cabinet to make the decision without express legislative
authority. If such doubt existed, and the claim to something more
than cabinet deliberations and committee hearings was clearly
justified, then legitimacy would require special legislation, bringing
into play the full legislative process.
In the end, the Charter turns out to play a rather modest
role at best in relation to exercises of federal executive power in
matters of foreign relations and defence. That role is to swing the
balance in cases of real doubt as the legal authority to make the
decision in question. Fundamental justice, by itself, lacks the force
to deny legitimacy to a cabinet decision falling within the
constitutional authority of that executive body. It is an applicable
standard of legitimacy, but where constitutional lines of authority are
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clearly drawn, its function is to enforce and reinforce those lines,
not to change them. Fundamental justice is not a standard at large.
It is loosely structured by our constitutional history and
contemporary standards of public morality and international law.
The rights-based view of the Charterinduced by the concept
of legality led counsel in the cruise missile case to use section 7 as
a battering ram rather than a lever. If the Charteris approached as
an important original source of law whose provisions are more
concerned with standards of legitimacy than legal rights, the
document can have a pervasive and salutary effect on our legal
system, and an educative value for all. Treating it as just a
catalogue of new legal rights will generate many precedents, but
probably at the price of losing its real potential as an original source
of law.
VI. CONTEXT
We invent and control doctrine, but not facts, and this seems
to influence our treatment of the two. The view reflected by legal
scholarship is one of settled doctrine brought to bear on unique
situations. The facts considered are the facts of the case. There is
little evidence of awareness of the world of contextual fact in which
doctrine takes its effect, or of the possibility that context deserves
systematic treatment as much as doctrine does. With the sole
exception of the scholarship of Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal' 1 5 there has been no recognition of a coherent world of
contextual fact within which legal doctrine operates, and no
systematic attempt to wed the two into a common framework of
The core of this scholarship is a course called "Law, Science and Policy: A
Jurisprudence for a Free Society" which was taught at Yale Law School over a period of two
decades, mostly to graduate students. Unfortunately, the materials for this course have never
been commercially published. Lasswell and McDougal considered it essential that legal
scholars adopt an observer's standpoint and draw on other disciplines in trying to understand
and guide processes of decision. The collaboration of these two men with other scholars
produced a number of policy-oriented studies of law, the best known of these being M.S.
McDougal & W. T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven & London: Yale
University Press, 1962), (dedicated to Harold Dwight Lasswell), and M.S. McDougal, H.V.
Lasswell & IA. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (New Haven & London: Yale
University Press, 1963).
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inquiry. The result is a tendency to look to doctrine for answers, as
though it were a closed system of truths, independent of the world
of fact.
A good framework of inquiry that interprets doctrine as
policy and surrounds it with relevant information offers no answers,
but presents interpretation as a matter of asking the right questions
to obtain the policy guidance and factual information needed to
reach a sound decision. To the extent that facts are contextual to
policy and not specific to a particular case, they should be integrated
into the process of interpretation.
In a rule-bound conception of law, doctrine is independent
of context. The doctrinal treatise is in theory a book of answers.
The refinement of analysis through sustained Herculean effort will
ultimately yield the right answer to any question. However, pure
doctrine persists in producing "right" answers that offend that strange
form of human radar, the sense of justice. Mrs. Murdoch's failure
to satisfy the requirements of trust doctrine for a share of the
matrimonial home is a case in point.16 When the disparity between
doctrinal truth and justice becomes too great, we are open to some
contextual fact on the side. In the aftermath of Mrs. Murdoch's
case, the input of contextual fact concerned the status of women in
Canadian society, a reality from which judges had apparently been
insulated. If the judges had been using a good contextual approach
to legal analysis, they would not have made the mistake they made
in the Murdoch case. The importance of context is greatest in
constitutional interpretation because of the generality and abstract
nature of much of the text, especially that of the Charter. The
potential damage from neglect of context is great.
The law-and-economics movement has been largely an
attempt to allow common law doctrine some direct access to
economic fact and analysis. Judges who are influenced by the
writings produced by the movement are really taking judicial notice
of matters of fact and expert opinion. This ensures some kind of
contextual approach to legal interpretation. However, compared to
the treatment of doctrine, it is very haphazard.
16

Murdoch v. Murdoch (1973), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 361 [hereinafter
Murdoch].
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Judicial notice, whether declared or not, is probably the main
channel through which context enters the process of interpretation.
The admission into evidence of an economic study or a Brandeis
Brief is exceptional. The reason for this seems to be our rigid
insistence on formal proof and rules of evidence for all factual
material and expert opinion. Contextual fact is officially regarded in
the same way as specific facts in dispute in a particular case. The
result is that necessary contextual fact comes in through the back
door of judicial notice, with little assurance that it is complete and
reliable or that it is not ideology in disguise. This situation will
persist until we learn how to integrate contextual fact into legal
analysis. The need for such integration is greatest in constitutional
interpretation, and the challenge of the new supremacy clause and
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides the occasion. We are
all searching for new directions.
The need for contextual facts is most obvious in relation to
aboriginal rights. There is no common experience to draw on.
Interpreters must be carefully and systematically informed about
aboriginal culture if a repetition of history is to be avoided.
Nowhere is this need more apparent than in recent Supreme Court
decisions concerning aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. The
constitutional doctrine of adoption of legislation by reference has
been taken from the context in which it was developed and .applied
in a way that permits the Parliament of Canada to abandon its
responsibility for aboriginal peoples to the provinces on a wholesale
basis. Legal doctrine detached from context permits the judges to
ignore completely the important historical evidence showing that the
federal responsibility for Indians is touched by a special charge to
protect the aboriginal peoples and their cultures, a charge that is
traced from the very beginning of British rule. When doctrine is
denied the guidance of a contextual approach, the fundamental
rights of a minority culture can be treated as no more important
than the right of federal carriers to be regulated by laws enacted by
the federal legislature.
The entrenchment of aboriginal rights in Section 35 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982 may force us to learn a balanced scholarship
that blends policy and contextual fact into a common framework of
inquiry to serve constitutional interpretation. If the policy of section
35 is to stop trying to run aboriginal people's lives and communities
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for them, then the questions we must ask take us beyond doctrinal
sources to the most complete and reliable factual sources we can
find. These facts are to section 35 what a general knowledge of
Canadian history and culture are to the Charter. However, because
they cannot be taken for granted as part of the common experience
of the judges, they serve well to illustrate the general importance of
a contextual approach.
It is unlikely that a body of scholarship that treats contextual
facts as systematically as doctrine will emerge on its own. There is
no market for it. What is more likely is that Supreme Court
judgments will increasingly take this form as the Charters need for
context convinces the judges that the haphazard treatment of
contextual facts will no longer do. It is already apparent that the
judges need and want something more than the old doctrinal
approach with its recital of settled truths and citation of precedents.
The Court should take the lead by giving us constitutional
interpretations that can serve as models of the contextual approach
needed to be developed systematically in constitutional scholarship.
VII. PRECEDENT
In the common law system, precedents are sources of law.
Constitutional interpretations cannot be precedents in the same
sense because the Constitution itself is the source. However large
the body of previous interpretations, interpretation must always
begin at the source. This is also true for statutes, but no harm has
resulted from the practice of treating statute interpretations as
though they were common law precedents so long as they were
looked to only for rules of construction. But that has not always
been the case. Cases interpreting statutes are too often treated as
though they were sources of law whose elaborations of statutory
language are annexed to the statute, like amendments, fixing the
meaning for all times and places. Interpreters are gradually denied
direct access to the statute itself and thus denied the opportunity to
read the language in context. They are given packaged meanings in
"precedents," to which they unconsciously apply the doctrine of stare
decisis. This practice induces a belief that there is a single, correct
interpretation of every statutory provision. This view, however, was

122
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recently abandoned by the Supreme Court of Canada. It recognized
that an administrative interpretation of a statute might differ from
a judicial one, but still be right for administrative purposes.1 7 That
was a significant insight into the importance of the interpreter's
perspective, that is, his view of the purposes of the document and
the context in which he sets the questions. It might lead to the
further insight that different judges in different times and places
might reach different conclusions about the best way to achieve the
purposes of a constitution. Interpretation needs a whole view of
document and context. It cannot be packaged in precedents.
The harm that would result from treating constitutional
interpretations like common law precedents would be much greater
than in the case of statutes and could not be overcome by legislative
amendment. The integrity of statutes can be protected by drafting
them in detail and by using ordinary language. A constitution, on
the other hand, is necessarily concise and general, making it
vulnerable to fragmentation. It is predictable, for example, that
absent a change in our thinking, there will develop around the term
"fundamental justice" a large body of cases which will gradually
replace the Charter as the primary frame of reference for
interpretation. In time, fundamental justice will cease to be a
standard of decision. It will be replaced by the formulations in the
"precedents" because of the place of pride accorded precedent in
our muddled theory, giving it a powerful hold on judicial minds.
Writ large, the same process will produce volumes of cases
that will be treated as "precedents" in the emerging field of "Charter
Law." This is the wrong road for the ConstitutionAct, 1982. It is
an important new source of law that must be allowed to speak for

17 Ile change in policy came in the decision in Service Employees'InternationalUnion,
Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association (1974), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 at 389,
41 D.L.R. (3d) 6 at 11, where Dickson, . stated of a labour relations board ruling that a staff
nurses association was a company dominated organization, ".. if the Board acts in good faith
and its decision can be rationally supported on a construction which the relevant legislation
may reasonably be considered to bear, then the Court will not intervene.' This was notice to
lower courts that they should no longer "correct" statute interpretations made by statutory
tribunals by substituting their own views as to the proper meaning of the language of the
statute. The case most recently cited for this new stance of judicial deference to specialized
tribunals is Canadian Union of PublicEmployees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.
(1979), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, (1980) 97 D.LR. (3d) 417.
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itself, in a whole voice. However large the body of interpretations
grows, the interpreter's first loyalty is to the document and its
language. This cannot be accomplished until the hold of precedents
on judicial thinking is broken, and for that we need an alternative
model of interpretation. We begin by asking why the legal approach
will not work.
First, the Constitution is not law in the usual sense. It is
true that it is made supreme law by section 52 of the 1982
document, but that is meant to confirm its primacy, putting it above
the legal system that it contains. The law prescribes standards of
legality for resolving conflicts that arise within the system. The
Constitution prescribes standards of legitimacy that govern the way
the system works. It is an attempt to express in words a preferred
theory of government. Legal language is not well suited to that
purpose, but an awareness of the nature and purpose of the
document will enable us to penetrate the rights formulations and see
it as a coherent set of related standards.
Second, the legal method derived from the common law
succeeds mainly by isolating problems and treating them as narrowly
as possible. The Constitution's thrust is in the opposite direction
towards systematic treatment of principles within a whole view of
their context.
Third, the Constitution now clearly derives its authority from
the people. This is an important change in theory, and it is no
longer acceptable to assert that meaning can be found in the
language alone. The new Constitution is valid because it is accepted
by the people as an appropriate set of standards of legitimacy. The
consent to be governed depends upon governments observing thdse
standards. If they do not, their resulting acts create no obligations
on citizens. It is this crucial matter of obligation to comply with law
that judges must decide in Chartercases. The common law's "micro"
approach to disputes fails to do justice to this high judicial function.
If the Constitution is the basic understanding between the
people and their government, then its interpretation should be
intelligible to the people. Interpretations should accordingly be
founded in the language of the Constitution,shaped by a whole view
of the document and structured around principles. The Constitution
is not a technical body of rules but a system of values. The aim of
interpretation is not to extract doctrinal truths, but to infer purposes
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and develop policies for advancing those purposes.
The
consequences of different interpretations are highly relevant as
measures of success or failure in achieving purposes. Doctrine
affects indifference to consequences and measures success or failure
in terms of conformity with settled truths. That is why doctrine is
so often treated in isolation from context, and why doctrine's way of
thinking is not suited to constitutional interpretation.
To free our minds from the mold of doctrinal thinking we
must overcome the tendency to see the Constitution as a kind of
"superstatute," to be interpreted by the same methods as are used
for statutes. The document expresses a theory of government, a set
of political principles, and its interpretation calls for explanations in
terms of principles. Rather than proceeding downwards through the
language to specifics, we should proceed up to principles and then
develop policies for harmonizing those principles through contextual
analysis. We must abandon the myth that answers are arrived at
through linear reasoning from fixed truths. What we are doing is
making difficult judgments about complex matters for which there
are no answers. Policies express preferences, and context enables us
to observe cause and effect and to predict consequences within the
limits of human understanding. That is the best we can do.
VIII. POLICY
One of the Charters main policies is a preference for
personal autonomy over state coercion. The strongest expression of
this policy is freedom of conscience, which is new to our
constitutional vocabulary. While it is joined to freedom of religion
and might appear to be just a secularization of that older freedom,
it is really of a different kind. The path to 1982 began with forced
observance of a state religion, then moved to a yielding to the
church of authority over morality, and finally to a recognition of
personal autonomy in matters of morality. However, we continued
to equate morality with religion; conscience and religion were
inseverable in our understanding of things. (An aboriginal person
would be forgiven for observing that only the white man could
define freedom in terms of a struggle between two authorities,
church and state, for the hearts and minds of people.)
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Freedom of conscience should be given a life of its own and
treated as a serious attempt to capture the essence of the greatest
political movement of our time, the drive to end coercion as a way
of life. Compared to many other countries, Canada is remarkably
free of state coercion, but it is unlikely that non-coercion is so
thoroughly instilled in the national consciousness and in our
institutions that we can relax our vigil. New possibilities for
coercion arise with each major advance in technology. Freedom of
conscience may in time become the kind of bulwark of a free society
that freedom of speech was in the early days of democratic
government.
For the first time we are presented with a constitutional
ethic of personal responsibility. There is no external authority - no
church, no state, no corporate or collective body - giving us
marching orders. Just ourselves. Perhaps this is the true essence of
a free and democratic society. We are responsible for the choices
we make in the exercise of freedom. The sooner we stop deceiving
ourselves on that score, the sooner the Chartercan become a shared
vision of society rather than a battleground for sterile ideological
debates. It becomes the Supreme Court's mission, then, not to
moralize, but to indicate the trade-offs between personal
responsibility and state coercion as a major policy theme of the
Charter. The more we surrender our personal autonomy to external
forces, the greater the level of state coercion required to preserve
the whole Constitution.
This may sound like wild speculation to those with
conventional ideas about constitutional interpretation, but in fact it
is obvious policy analysis. It requires only a little knowledge of
history to infer from the Charter a major concern with state
coercion. While this policy does not by itself resolve concert
disputes, it does provide a sound starting point and continuing
direction for analyzing those disputes in context. Policy analysis
keeps us continually aware of the purposes we are pursuing and of
context and trade-offs being made. It also produces interpretations
that can be understood by the people, whose collective and
individual self-determination depend upon a thorough understanding
of the Constitution and how it works. The people cannot govern
themselves if that understanding is withheld from them.
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The constitutional treatise of the future should be organized
around major policies that emerge from a purposive reading of the
document, and should develop these policies in their full context.
The time we now spend in creating, gathering, and digesting verbal
formulations can be diverted to formulating questions and integrating
contextual facts with policy analysis.

